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COMMEENT
THE STATE ADVISORY OPINION IN PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Characteristics of an Advisory Opinion
An advisory opinion is an answer given by the justices of a state's highest
court acting in their individual capacities, at the request of a coordinate
branch of government, to a legal question regarding a matter pending before
the requesting authority.' Advisory opinions are meant to function in a
prophylactic fashion, on the theory that the requesting branch will not act in
a manner inconsistent with the justices' opinion of the legality or constitution-
ality of the proposed action. 2 Ten states presently have advisory opinion
procedures. 3 In seven states, the advisory opinion mechanism may be invoked
1. E.g., A. Ellingwood, Departmental Cooperation in State Government 253(1918) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ellingwood]; 7 N.Y. State Constitutional Convention Comm., Problems Related to
Legislative Organization and Powers 294 (1938); Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in Federal
Supreme Court, 23 Geo. L.J. 643, 645 n. 10 (1935); Stevens, Advisory Opinions-Present Status
and an Evaluation, 34 Wash. L. Rev. 1-3 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Stevens].
2. E.g., 7 N.Y. State Constitutional Convention Comm., Problems Related to Legislative
Organization and Powers 297 (1938); Field, The Advisory Opinion-An Analysis, 24 Ind. L.J.
203, 221 (1949) (give advice to public bodies) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinion Analysis];
Hagemann, The Advisory Opinion in South Dakota, 16 S.D.L. Rev. 291, 292 (1971) (determine if
proposed governmental action is constitutional) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinions in South
Dakota]; Note, Judicial Determinations in Nonadversary Proceedings, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 723, 731
(1959) (determine validity of governmental course of action before put into operation); Note,
Advisory Opinions on the Constitutionality of Statutes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1302, 1304 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinions on Statutes]. But see Ala. Code tit. 13, § 35 (1958); In re
Opinion of the justices, 254 Ala. 177, 178,47 So. 2d 655, 656 (1950)(give protective forceand effect to
state officials acting under existing law).
3. In seven, express constitutional provisions authorize the justices to give advisory opinions.
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3; Fla. Const. art. 4, § 1(c); Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Mass. Cost. pt. 2,
ch. 3, art. H; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 74; R.I. Const. amend. 12, § 2; S.D. Const. art. V, § S. In
two states the practice is statutory. Ala. Code tit. 13, § 34 (1958); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141
(1975). In the tenth state the power of the justices to render such opinions was created by judicial
decision. Waddell v. Berry, 31 N.C. 361, 40 N.C. 305 (1849). For an explanation of the initial
development of advisory opinion practice in North Carolina, see Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in
North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 297, 299-302 (1949). Although some commentators have
included Oklahoma among states with opinion mechanism, Stevens, supra note 1, at 3 & n.9;
Comment, Advisory Opinions in Florida: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Cooperation, 24 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 328 & n.4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinions in Florida]; Note, The Case for
an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 Geo. L.J. 785, 788 & n.23 (1962), the Oklahoma
provision merely empowers the governor to request the justices' opinion as to whether the legal
requirements for imposition of capital punishment have been met if a condemned person has failed to
appeal his death sentence. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 1002-03 (1958); Clovis & Updegraff, Advisory
Opinions, 13 Iowa L. Rev. 188, 193-94 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Clovis]. This unique limitation on
the subject matter of the Oklahoma advisory opinion mechanism justifies its exclusion from general
analysis. In eight states-Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
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by the governor or by either house of the legislature. 4 In the other three, only
the governor may request the justices' advice in this manner. 5
Because an advisory opinion is an expression of the views of the individual
justices, it is not considered a holding of the court;6 rather, it is an extrajudi-
cial function of the justices. 7 Consequently, the theoretical view is that an
advisory opinion does not bind the requesting branch to act in accordance
with the advice rendered. Neither the justices themselves, nor private parties
are bound by the conclusions reached in an advisory opinion when the same
subject matter arises in subsequent litigation.8 Thus, because advisory opin-
ions are non-binding and purely advisory, neither stare decisis nor res judicata
applies. 9
Pennsylvania and Vermont-the advisory opinion procedure has been discontinued. Stevens, supra
note 1, at 7 & n.32. For a history of advisory opinions in the United States see Ellingwood, supra note
1, at 30-78.
4. Ala. Code tit. 13, § 34 (1958); Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3; Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Mass.
Const. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II, § 83; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 74; R.I. Const. amend. 12, § 2; see
Waddell v. Berry, 31 N.C. 361, 40 N.C. 305 (1849) (legislature); In re Hughes, 61 N.C. 65, 70-71
(1867) (advisory opinion to the governor reported within case). In Massachusetts and Maine, the
executive council is also authorized to request advisory opinions. Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Mass.
Const. pt. 2, ch. 2, art. II, § 83..
5. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141 (1975); Fla. Const. art. 4, § 1(c); S.D. Const. art. V, § S.
6. E.g., Collins v. Horten, 111 So. 2d 746, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Opinion of tile
Justices, 281 A.2d 321, 322 (Me. 1971); Opinion to the Governor, 109 R.I. 289, 291, 284 A.2d
295, 296 (1971); Ala. Code tit. 13, § 34 (1958); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141 (1975); Me. Const.
art. VI, § 3; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II, § 83; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 74; R.I. Const.
amend. XII, § 2; Ellingwood, supra note 1, at 221; J. Thayer, Constitutional Law, in Legal Essays
34-35 (1927); Clovis, supra note 3, at 192. Until 1972, Colorado was the only state where advisory
opinions were rendered by the court rather than by the justices. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3. See also
Ellingwood, supra note 1, at 221-22. In that year, the words of the South Dakota Constitution were
amended to empower the governor to request advisory opinions from the "court." S.D. Const. art.
V, § 5, amending id. § 13 (1889). The alteration seems to have been inadvertent, however, resulting
from the consolidation of five sections concerning the court's jurisdiction. Id. The historical note to
the present section makes no reference to the wording change, perhaps confirming the view that It
occurred by accident. Historical Note to S.D. Const. art. V, § 5 (1972). On the other hand, two of the
three advisory opinions rendered after the amendment were entitled "Opinion of the Supreme
Court." 209 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1973); 204 N.W.2d 184 (S.D. 1973). The third, continuing South
Dakota's inconsistent prior practice, was entitled "Opinion of the Justices." 203 N.W.2d 526 (S.D.
1973).
7. In re Opinions of the Justices, 209 Ala. 593, 598, 96 So. 487, 491-93 (1923); Laughlin v. City
of Portland, 111 Me. 486, 497, 90 A. 318, 322-23 (1914); see In re State Indus. Comm., 224 N.Y. 13,
16-17, 119 N.E. 1027, 1028 (1918); Clovis, supra note 3, at 192; cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 40, 50 (1851). But see In re Opinion of the Justices, 115 Vt. 524, 529-30, 64 A.2d 169, 172
(1949).
8. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 157 Me. 152, 158, 170 A.2d 652, 655 (1961); Opinion to the
Governor, 109 R.I. 289, 291, 284 A.2d 295, 296 (1971); Thayer, John Marshall, in Thayer, Holmes,
and Frankfurter on John Marshall 57 (1967); Clovis, supra note 3, at 195; Stevens, supra note 1, at 6
& cases cited in n.28.
9. E.g., Opinion of the Justices, 281 A.2d 321, 322 (Me. 1971); City of New Bedford v. New
Bedford S.S. Authority, 336 Mass. 651, 656, 148 N.E.2d 637, 640, appeal dismissed sub nom.
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In practice, however, state and federal courts evidently have failed to
distinguish the precedential weight of justices' advisory opinions from court
holdings. '0 This difference between practice and theory has been one argument
against the advisory opinion procedure. Critics have claimed that, not-
withstanding theory, such opinions do bind parties in subsequent litigation and
thus deprive them of the right to a full and fair hearing. " I Advocates contend,
however, that it is only the intrinsic value-the clarity of reasoning-of some
advisory opinions that gives them weight in later litigation.' 2
In Alabama, Delaware and Florida, the justices' power to give advisory
opinions is limited to questions of constitutional dimension. 1 3 On the other hand,
in Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and South Dakota,
constitutional provisions more broadly specify that advisory opinions may be
rendered on "important questions of law" and on "solemn occasions."' 4 The
Boston Five Cents Say. Bank v. City of New Bedford, 358 U.S. 53 (1958) (per curiam); Goodman,
Advisory Opinions, in 1964 Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law 95, 108-09 (R. Huber ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as Massachusetts Survey]; Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and Interna-
tional Courts, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 970, 983 (1924); Sands, Government by Judiciary-Advisory
Opinions in Alabama, 4 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Opinions in
Alabama); Advisory Opinions in Florida, supra note 3, at 332. In Colorado, advisory opinions have
been held to be binding precedent because they are rendered by the court. Robinson, Limitations
upon Legislative Inquiries under Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause, 4 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 237,
246-47 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause].
10. In the following cases, for example, courts have cited advisory opinions with the same
effect as opinions of the court: Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 42 n.3 (1974) (Supreme Court listed
New Hampshire advisory opinion among conflicting views of various courts, citing Opinion of
the Justicea, 109 N.H. 508, 256 A.2d 500 (1969)); Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653, 661
(E.D. La. 1974); Kingston v. McLaughlin, 359 F. Supp. 25, 27 (D. Mass. 1972). aff'd, 411 U.S.
923 (1973); Besaw v. Affleck, 333 F. Supp. 775, 780 & n.7 (D.RII. 1971); Strange v. James, 323
F. Supp. 1230, 1234 & n.8 (D. Kan. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Allardice v. Adams
County, 173 Colo. 133, 138, 476 P.2d 982, 985 (1970); State v. Shepard, 323 A.2d 587, 589 (Me.
1974); Concord Inv. Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, - N.H. -, -, 316 A.2d 192, 194-95 (1974); Bailey
v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316, 319 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State e-x rel. Widergren v. Charette,
110 R.I. 124, 131, 290 A.2d 858, 862 (1972); Olson v. State, 484 S.W.2d 756, 761 n.8 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969); State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 870, 514 P.2d 1069, 1073 (1973); Uhls v. State
ex rel. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 74, 87 (Wyo. 1967); Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2
Me. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1908); Advisory Opinion Analysis, supranote 2, at 216; Advisory Opinions in South
Dakota, supra note 2, at 296.
11. Edsall, The Advisory Opinion in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 297, 330-33 (1949);
10 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1896); see J. Thayer, Advisory Opinions, in Legal Essays 58-59 (1927);
Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2 Me. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1908).
12. Clovis, supra note 3, at 195; Advisory Opinions in South Dakota, supra note 2, at 297. See
also D. Pratap, The Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court 231 (1972).
13. Ala. Code tit. 13, § 34 (1959) ("important constitutional questions"); Del. Code Ann. tit.
10, § 141(a) (1975) (construction of state and Federal Constitutions; constitutionality of laws
enacted by the legislature or of constitutional amendments); Fla. Const. art. 4, § 1(c) (interpreta-
tion of constitution upon any question affecting governor's duties or powers).
14. Colo. ConsL art. VI, § 3; Me. Const. art. VI, § 3; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. n; N.H.
Const pt. 2, arL 74; S.D. Const. art. V, § 5; Clovis, supra note 3, at 191. The justices, rather than the
requesting authority, determine whether the inquiry falls within the justices' constitutional power to
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Rhode Island constitution appears to impose on the justices the broadest duty,
requiring opinions on "any question whenever requested." 5 Rhode Island's
justices, however, have construed this mandate to require opinions only on
constitutional questions.16 Generally, in all of the states, the justices have
interpreted their advisory opinion jurisdiction narrowly.17
B. Focus of the Study
This Comment was written to examine the role that advisory opinions serve
in the ten states in which they presently exist in light of the frequency
and subject matter of requests. Requests-the petitions from the requesting
authority for consideration of the subject matter contained therein-and their
specific questions will be categorized and analyzed to provide the reader with
a focal point for an understanding of the advisory opinion mechanism and a
possible departure point for further study and analysis.
Among the specific considerations to be examined are: the areas that most
frequently are the focus of requests; the branches of state governments that
inquire as to the various categories; the trends that are observable in the types
of requests submitted; the pressures or concerns that motivate particular
requests; the procedural mechanisms that have been erected by the justices to
enhance, or possibly retard, the effectiveness of advisory opinions; and
finally, the reasons why the mechanism has not developed in other states.
II. FOURTEEN YEARS OF ADVISORY OPINION PRACTICE
A. Methodology
The following sections of this Comment analyze in quantitative terms the
use of the advisory opinion rhechanism from 1960 through 1973 in eight
states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island and South Dakota. The data upon which this study is based
was derived from examination and classification of all reported advisory
opinions for those years.' 8 First, requests are examined to provide an
answer. In re Senate Res. No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 111, 31 P.2d 325,329 (1933); Opinion of the Justices,
281 A.2d 321, 322-23 (Me. 1971); Advisory Opinions in South Dakota, supra note 2, at 298; Colorado
Advisory Opinion Clause, supra note 9, at 249-50.
15. R.I. Const. amend. XII, § 2.
16. Opinion to the Governor, 96 R.I. 358, 364, 191 A.2d 611, 614 (1963).
17. Opinion of the Justices, 291 Ala. 581, 586, 285 So. 2d 87, 91-92 (1973) (Heflin, C.J.,
Bloodworth & Maddox, JJ., dissenting); Answer of the Justices, - Mass. -, -, 291 N.E.2d
598, 600 (1973); Opinion to the House of Representatives, 99 R.I. 377, 379, 208 A.2d 126, 127-28
(1965); In re Ch. 6, Sess. Laws of 1890, 8 S.D. 74, 66 N.W. 310 (1896); Colorado Advisory
Opinion Clause, supra note 9, at 237; Stevens, supranote 1, at 4-5. Butsee Opinion of the Justices, 57
Del. 495, 496, 202 A.2d 276, 277 (1964) (non-constitutional questions answered to preclude
unnecessary litigation and prevent disenfranchisement of eligible voters); Advisory Opinions in
Florida, supra note 3, at 334-35.
18. No North Carolina advisory opinions were reported during this period. Since advisory
opinions in that state were recorded haphazardly in the past, the absence of reported opinions
does not prove conclusively that the mechanism was not used. See Edsall, The Advisory Opinion
in North Carolina, 27 N.C.L. Rev. 297, 299-302 (1949).
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overview of the frequency with which the procedure has been used. Second,
questions-the specific inquiries contained within the requests that set forth
the substantive concerns of the requesting authority-are categorized and
evaluated to determine the particular topics about which the requesters are
most interested. For convenience, summaries are provided in the Appendix
showing the number of requests submitted, and the number not entertained
by the justices. It also shows the number of questions posed in requests
entertained by the justices both in total and by category. Unless otherwise
specified, the data discussed in the following sections is taken from the
material set forth in that Appendix.1 9
The requesting authorities in Colorado sought advisory opinions from the state supreme court
on only eleven occasions between 1960 and 1973. The justices entertained nine of these requests.
Due to this infrequency, Colorado has not been included in the general analysis. A summary for
that state is found in the Appendix, infra.
19. For the remainder of this Comment, advisory opinions will be cited in an abbreviated
form consisting of two letters designating the state and a numeral identifying the particular
opinion. The full citation for each opinion is provided below. The requesting authority is as
follows: L-legislature; G-governor; C-executive council.
Opinion Requesting
Number Authority
Alabama
A.1 L 272 Ala. 478, 132
So. 2d 142 (1961)
A.2 G 272 Ala. 480, 132
So. 2d 381 (1961)
A.3 L 272 Ala. 512, 132
So. 2d 753 (1961)
A.4 L 275 Ala. 102, 152
So. 2d 427 (1963)
A.5 G 275 Ala. 254, 154
So. 2d 12 (1963)
A.6 L 275 Ala. 372, 155
So. 2d 329 (1963)
A.7 L 275 Ala. 386, 155
So. 2d 343 (1963)
A.8 L 275 Ala. 409, 155
So. 2d 513 (1963)
A.9 L 275 Ala. 465, 156
So. 2d 151 (1963)
A.10 G 275 Ala. 547, 156
So. 2d 639 (1963)
A.11 G 276 Ala. 239, 160
So. 2d 648 (1964)
A.12 L 277 Ala. 630, 173
So. 2d 793 (1965)
A.13 L 278 Ala. 98, 176
So. 2d 29 (1965)
Citation
L 278 Ala. 298, 178
So. 2d 76 (1965)
L 278 Ala. 412, 178
So. 2d 641 (1965)
L 278 Ala. 522. 179
So. 2d 155 (1965)
G 279 Ala. 38, 181
So. 2d 105 (1965)
L 280 Ala. 653, 197
So. 2d 456 (1967)
L 280 Ala. 692, 198
So. 2d 269 (1967)
L 281 Ala. 20, 198
So. 2d 304 (1967)
L 281 Ala. 50. 198
So. 2d 778 (1967)
L 281 Ala. 187, 200
So. 2d 486 (1967)
L 281 Ala. 231, 201
So. 2d 103 (1967)
L 281 Ala. 325, 202
So. 2d 168 (1967)
G 283 Ala. 341, 217
So. 2d 53 (1968)
L 284 Ala. 129, 222
So. 2d 714 (1969)
Opinion Requesting
Number Authority Citation
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Requesting
Authority Citation
Opinion
Number
A.27
A.28
A.29
A.30
A.31
A.32
A.33
A.34
Opinion Requesting
Number Authority
A.35
A.36
A.37
A.38
A.39
A.40
A.41
Citation
L 287 Ala. 337, 251
So. 2d 755 (1971)
L 287 Ala. 342, 251
So. 2d 759 (1971)
L 288 Ala. 89, 257
So. 2d 336 (1972)
L 291 Ala. 128, 278
So. 2d 711 (1973)
L 291 Ala. 262, 280
So. 2d 97 (1973)
L 291 Ala. 301, 280
So. 2d 547 (1973)
G 291 Ala. 581, 285
So. 2d 87 (1973)
Colorado
C.1 G 142 Colo. 188, 350
P.2d 811 (1960)
C.2 L 154 Colo. 141, 389
P.2d 87 (1964)
C.3 L 157 Colo. 76, 400
P.2d 931 (1965)
C.4 G 162 Colo. 188, 425
P.2d 31 (1967)
C.5 G 163 Colo. 45, 428
P.2d 75 (1967)
C.6 G 163 Colo. 113, 429
P.2d 304 (1967)
C.7 L 168 Colo. 558, 452
P.2d 391 (1969)
C.8 L 168 Colo. 563, 452
P.2d 382 (1969)
C.9 L 171 Colo. 200, 467
P.2d 56 (1970)
C. 10 L 177 Colo. 215, 493
P.2d 346 (1972)
C.11 L 178 Colo. 311, 497
P.2d 1024 (1972)
Delaware
D.1 G 54 Del. 164, 174
A.2d 818 (1961)
D.2 G 54 Del. 209, 175
A.2d 405 (1961)
D.3 G 54 Del. 222, 175
A.2d 543 (1961)
D.4 G 54 Del. 366, 177
A.2d 205 (1962)
D.5 G 54 Del. 524, 181
A.2d 215 (1962)
D.6 G 56 Del. 75, 189
A.2d 777 (1963)
D.7 G 56 Del. 118, 190
A.2d 519 (1963)
D.8 G 56 Del. 121, 190
A.2d 521 (1963)
D.9 G 57 Del. 19, 194
A.2d 855 (1963)
D.10 G 57 Del. 202 (1963)
D.11 G 57 Del. 264, 198
A.2d 687 (1964)
D.12 G 57 Del. 388, 200
A.2d 570 (1964)
D.13 G 57 Del. 495, 202
A.2d 276 (1964)
D.14 G 58 Del. 475, 210
A.2d 852 (1965)
D.15 G 59 Del. 196, 216
A.2d 668 (1966)
D.16 G 225 A.2d 481 (1966)
D.17 G 232 A.2d 103 (1967)
D.18 G 233 A.2d 59 (1967)
[Vol. 44
L 284 Ala. 484, 226
So. 2d 87 (1969)
G 284 Ala. 626, 227
So. 2d 396 (1969)
G 286 Ala. 156, 238
So. 2d 326 (1970)
L 287 Ala. 321, 251
So. 2d 739 (1971)
L 287 Ala. 325, 251
So. 2d 742 (1971)
L 287 Ala. 326, 251
So. 2d 744 (1971)
L 287 Ala. 331, 251
So. 2d 749 (1971)
L 287 Ala. 334, 251
So. 2d 751 (1971)
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Opinion
Number
D.19
D.20
D.21
D.22
D.23
D.24
D.25
D.26
Requesting
Authority
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
G
Opinion Requesting
Number Authority
D.27 G
D.28 G
D.29 G
D.30 G
D.31 G
D.32 G
D.33 G
D.34 G
Florida
131 So. 2d 196 (1961)
132 So. 2d 1 (1961)
132 So. 2d 163 (1961)
150 So. 2d 721 (1963)
154 So. 2d 838 (1963)
156 So. 2d 3 (1963)
171 So. 2d 539 (1965)
192 So. 2d 757 (1966)
196 So. 2d 737 (1967)
200 So. 2d 534 (1967)
201 So. 2d 226 (1967)
206 So. 2d 212 (1968)
206 So. 2d 641 (1968)
Maine
Me.1 L 157 Me. 98, 170
A.2d 657 (1961)
Me.2 L 157 Me. 104, 170
A.2d 647 (1961)
Me.3 L 157 Me. 152, 170
A.2d 652 (1961)
Me.4 L 157 Me. 187, 170
A.2d 660 (1961)
Me.5 G 157 Me. 525, 175
A.2d 728 (1961)
Me.6 L 159 Me. 77, 190
A.2d 910 (1963)
Me.7 L 159 Me. 209, 191
A.2d 357 (1963)
Me.8 L 159 Me. 410, 191
A.2d 637 (1963)
Me.9 L 159 Me. 420, 191
A.2d 627 (1963)
Me.10 L 161 Me. 32, 206
A.2d 541 (1965)
Me.11 L 161 Me. 182, 210
A.2d 683 (1965)
Me.12 L 216 A.2d 651 (1966)
Me. 13
Me. 14
Me. 15
Me. 16
Me. 17
Me. 18
Me. 19
Me.20
Me.21
Me.22
Me.23
Me.24
Me.25
Me.26
Me.27
Me.28
Me.29
Me.30
Me.31
Me.32
Me.33
Me.34
Me.35
Citation
.2d 716 (1968)
.2d 172 (1968)
.2d 90 (1968)
.2d 869 (1968)
.2d 827 (1969)
.2d 164 (1969)
.2d 342 (1970)
.2d 558 (1971)
Citation
276 A.2d 736 (1971)
283 A.id 832 (1971)
290 A.2d 645 (1972)
295 A.2d 718 (1972)
305 A.2d 607 (1973)
306 A.2d 720 (1973)
314 A.2d 419 (1973)
315 A.2d 591 (1973)
213 So. 2d 716 (1968)
214 So. 2d 473 (1968)
217 So. 2d 289 (1968)
223 So. 2d 35 (1969)
225 So. 2d 512 (1969)
229 So. 2d 229 (1969)
239 So, 2d 1 (1970)
239 So. 2d 247 11970)
243 So. 2d 573 (1971)
247 So. 2d 428 (1971)
271 So. 2d 128 (1972)
276 So. 2d 25 (1973)
281 So. 2d 328 (1973)
216 A.2d 656 (1966)
227 A.2d 303 (1967)
229 A.2d 829 (1967)
230 A.2d 802 (1967)
230 A.2d 804 (1967)
230 A.2d 807 (1967)
231 A.2d 104 (1967)
231 A.2d 431 (1967)
231 A.2d 617 (1967)
237 A.2d 400 (1968)
253 A.2d 309 (1969)
255 A.2d 643 (1969)
255 A.2d 652 (1969)
255 A.2d 655 (1969)
255 A 2d 886 (1969)
260 A.2d 142 (1969)
261 A.2d 53 (1970)
261 A.2d 58 (1970)
261 A.2d 250 (1970)
275 A.2d 800 (1971)
276 A.2d 441 (1971)
278 A.2d 693 (1971)
281 A.2d 244 (1971)
F.1
F.2
F.3
F.4
F.5
F.6
F.7
F.8
F.9
F.10
F.11
F. 12
F.13
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Citation
281 A.2d 321 (1971)
283 A.2d 234 (1971)
303 A.2d 452 (1973)
306 A.2d 18 (1973)
Opinion Requesting
Number Authority
Me.40 L
Me.41 L
Me.42 G
Citation
307 A.2d 198 (1973)
308 A.2d 253 (1973)
311 A.2d 103 (1973)
Massachusetts
Ma.l L 341 Mass. 738, 167
N.E.2d 745 (1960)
Ma.2 L 341 Mass. 760, 168
N.E.2d 858 (1960)
Ma.3 L 344 Mass. 766, 181
N.E.2d 793 (1962)
Ma.4 L 345 Mass. 780, 189
N.E.2d 849 (1963)
Ma.5 L 346 Mass. 791, 191
N.E.2d 779 (1963)
Ma.6 L 347 Mass. 784, 196
N.E.2d 225 (1964)
Ma.7 L 347 Mass. 789, 196
N.E.2d 912 (1964)
Ma.8 L 347 Mass. 792, 196
N.E.2d 919 (1964)
Ma.9 L 347 Mass. 797, 197
N.E.2d 691 (1964)
Ma. 10 L 347 Mass. 804, 199
N.E.2d 179 (1964)
Ma. Il G 348 Mass. 803, 202
N.E.2d 234 (1964)
Ma.12 L 349 Mass. 779, 207
N.E.2d 264 (1965)
Ma.13 L 349 Mass. 786, 208
N.E.2d 240 (1965)
Ma.14 L 349 Mass. 794, 208
N.E.2d 823 (1965)
Ma.15 C 349 Mass. 802, 212
N.E.2d 217 (1965)
Ma. 16 L 349 Mass. 804, 212
N.E.2d 562 (1965)
Ma.17 L 351 Mass. 716, 219
N.E.2d 18 (1966)
Ma.18 L 353 Mass. 779, 229
N.E.2d 263 (1967)
Ma.19 G 353 Mass. 785, 229
N.E.2d 715 (1967)
Ma.20 L 353 Mass. 790, 230
N.E.2d 801 (1967)
Ma.21 C 353 Mass. 801, 233
N.E.2d 906 (1968)
Ma.22 L 354 Mass. 779, 236
N.E.2d 523 (1968)
Ma.23 L 354 Mass. 789, 236
N.E.2d 926 (1968)
Ma.24 L 354 Mass. 792, 236
N.E.2d 882 (1968)
Ma.25 L 354 Mass. 799, 238
N.E.2d 855 (1968)
Ma.26 G 354 Mass. 804, 241
N.E.2d 91 (1968)
Ma.27 G 356 Mass. 744, 247
N.E.2d 718 (1969)
Ma.28 L 356 Mass. 747, 249
N.E.2d 23 (1969)
Ma.29 L 356 Mass. 751, 250
N.E.2d 425 (1969)
Ma.30 L 356 Mass. 756, 250
N.E.2d 448 (1969)
Ma.31 L 356 Mass. 761, 250
N.E.2d 428 (1969)
Ma.32 L 356 Mass. 769, 250
N.E.2d 450 (1969)
Ma.33 L 356 Mass. 775, 250
N.E.2d 547 (1969)
Ma.34 G 356 Mass. 814, 254
N.E.2d 258 (1969)
Ma.35 L 357 Mass. 787, 256
N.E.2d 420 (1970)
Ma.36 L 357 Mass. 827, 257
N.E.2d 94 (1970)
Ma.37 L 357 Mass. 831, 258
N.E.2d 731 (1970)
Ma.38 L 357 Mass. 836, 258
N.E.2d 779 (1970)
Ma.39 L 357 Mass. 846, 259
N.E.2d 564 (1970)
Ma.40 L 358 Mass. 827, 260
N.E.2d 740 (1970)
Ma.41 L 358 Mass. 833, 262
N.E.2d 590 (1970)
Ma.42 L 358 Mass. 838, 267
N.E.2d 113 (1971)
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Opinion Requesting
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Ma.52 L - AMass. -, 284
N.E.2d 919 (1972)
Ma.53 G - hass. -, 287
N.E.2d 910 (1972)
Ma.54 C - Mass. -, 291
N.E.2d 598 (1973)
Ma.55 G - Mass. -, 294
N.E.2d 346 (1973)
Ma.56 L - Mass. -, 298
N.E.2d 829 (1973)
Ma.57 G - htas. -, 298
N.E.2d 840 (1973)
Ma.58 G - Mass. -, 302
N.E.2d 565 (1973)
Ma.59 L - Mass. -, 303
N.E.2d 320 (1973)
New Hampshire
N.H.I G 102 N.H. 565, 163
A.2d 1 (1960)
N.H.2 L 103 N.H. 256, 169
A.2d 279 (1961)
N.H.3 L 103 N.H. 258, 169
A.2d 634 (1961)
N.H.4 L 103 N.H. 262, 169
A.2d 637 (1961)
N.H.5 L 103 N.H. 268, 169
A.2d 762 (1961)
N.H.6 L 103 N.H. 281, 170
A.2d 125 (1961)
N.H.7 L 103 N.H. 325, 171
A.2d 429 (1961)
N.H.8 L 103 N.H. 333, 171
A.2d 923 (1961)
N.H.9 G 103 N.H. 381, 173
A.2d 578 (1961)
N.H.10 G 103 N.H. 402, 174
A.2d 420 (1961)
N.H.11 G 103 N.H. 508, 175
A.2d 396 (1961)
N.H.12 G 104 N.H. 261, 183
A.2d 909 (1962)
N.H.13 G 104 N.H. 342, 186
A.2d 579 (1962)
N.H.14 L 105 N.H. 22, 192
A.2d 22 (1963)
N.H.15 L 105 N.H. 125, 193
A.2d 880 (1963)
N.H.16 L 106 N.H. 180, 207
A.2d 574 (1965)
N.H.17 L 106 N.H. 202, 208
A.2d 458 (1965)
N.H.18 L 106 N.H. 233, 209
A.2d 471 (1965)
N.H.19 L 106 N.H. 237, 209
A.2d 474 (1965)
N.H.20 G 106 N.H. 402, 213
A.2d 415 (1965)
N.H.21 G 106 N.H. 449, 213
A.2d 915 (1965)
N.H.22 G 107 N.H. 325, 221
A.2d 255 (1966)
N.H.23 G 108 N.H. 62, 228
A.2d 165 (1967)
N.H.24 L 108 N.H. 97, 228
A.2d 161 (1967)
N.H.25 L 108 N.H. 103, 229
A.2d 188 (1967)
N.H.26 L 108 N.H. 170, 230
A.2d 221 (1967)
N.H.27 G 108 N.H. 268, 233
A.2d 832 (1967)
N.H.28 G 109 N.H. 36, 241
A.2d 213 (1968)
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Ma.43 G 359 Mass. 769, 268
N.E.2d 149 (1971)
Ma.44 L 359 Mass. 775, 268
N.E.2d 159 (1971)
Ma.45 G - Mass. -, 271
N.E.2d 335 (1971)
Ma.46 L 360 Mass. 888, 273
N.E.2d 879 (1971)
Ma.47 G 360 Mass. 894, 274
N.E.2d 336 (1971)
Ma.48 L 360 Mass. 903, 276
N.E.2d 694 (1971)
Ma.49 G 360 Mass. 907, 277
N.E.2d 293 (1971)
Ma.50 G - Mass. -, 282
N.E.2d 629 (1972)
Ma.51 L - Mass. -, 284
N.E.2d 908 (1972)
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Opinion Requesting
Number Authority
N.H.29 G 109 N.H. 191, 246
A.2d 699 (1968)
N.H.30 G 109 N.H. 335, 251
A.2d 330 (1969)
N.H.31 L 109 N.H. 366, 252
A.2d 429 (1969)
N.H.32 L 109 N.H. 367, 253
A.2d 492 (1969)
N.H.33 L 109 N.H. 396, 254
A.2d 273 (1969)
N.H.34 L 109 N.H. 473, 254
A.2d 845 (1969)
N.H.35 G 109 N.H. 508, 256
A.2d 500 (1969)
N.H.36 L 109 N.H. 578, 258
A.2d 343 (1969)
N.H.37 G 110 N.H. 26, 259
A.2d 660 (1970)
N.H.38 G 110 N.H. 117, 262
A.2d 290 (1970)
N.H.39 L 110 N.H. 206, 266
A.2d 111 (1970)
N.H.40 G 110 N.H. 359, 266
A.2d 823 (1970)
N.H.41 L 111 N.H. 129, 276
A.2d 489 (1971)
N.H.42 L 111 N.H. 131, 276
A.2d 817 (1971)
N.H.43 L 111 N.H. 136, 276
A.2d 821 (1971)
N.H.44 L 111 N.H. 144, 276
A.2d 479 (1971)
N.H.45 L 111 N.H. 146, 276
A.2d 825 (1971)
N.H.46 L Ill N.H. 175, 278
A.2d 475 (1971)
N.H.47 L 111 N.H. 197, 279
A.2d 601 (1971)
Rhode Island
R.I.1
R.I.2
RI.3
L 90 R.I. 224, 157
A.2d 113 (1960)
G 91 R.I. 187, 162
A.2d 814 (1960)
G 91 R.I. 346, 162
A.2d 802 (1960)
R.I.4
R.I.5
R.I.6
G 92 R.I. 46, 166
A.2d 224 (1960)
G 92 R.I. 489, 170
A.2d 284 (1961)
G 93 R.I. 28, 170
A.2d 908 (1961)
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Number
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N.H.48 L 111 N.H. 199, 278
A.2d 357 (1971)
N.H.49 L 111 N.H. 206, 278
A.2d 348 (1971)
N.H.50 L 111 N.H. 210, 279
A.2d 741 (1971)
N.H.51 L 112 N.H. 32, 287
A.2d 756 (1972)
N.H.52 L 112 N.H. 42, 288
A.2d 697 (1972)
N.H.53 L 112 N.H. 166, 290
A.2d 869 (1972)
N.H.54 G 112 N.H. 433, 298
A.2d 118 (1972)
N.H.55 G 113 N.H. 87, 302
A.2d 112 (1973)
N.H.56 G 113 N.H. 141, 303
A.2d 752 (1973)
N.H.57 L 113 N.H. 149, 304
A.2d 86 (1973)
N.H.58 L 113 N.H. 201, 304
A.2d 89 (1973)
N.H.59 L 113 N.H. 205, 304
A.2d 881 (1973)
N.H.60 L 113 N.H. 217, 304
A.2d 872 (1973)
N.H.61 L 113 N.H. 287, 306
A.2d 55 (1973)
N.H.62 L 113 N.H. 297, 307
A.2d 558 (1973)
N.H.63 G 113 N.H. 457, 309
A.2d 215 (1973)
N.H.64 G 113 N.H. 466, 309
A.2d 502 (1973)
N.H.65 G 312 A.2d 702 (1973)
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Opinion Requesting
Citation Number Authority
R.I.7 G 93 R.I. 211, 172
A.2d 596 (1961)
R.I.8 G 93 R-I. 262, 174
A.2d 553 (1961)
R.I.9 L 93 R.I. 463, 176
A.2d 391 (1962)
R1I.10 L 93 R-I. 465, 176
A.2d 393 (1962)
RI.11 G 94 RI. 464, 181
A.2d 618 (1962)
R.I.12 G 95 R.I. 88, 183
A.2d 806 (1962)
R.I.13 G 95 R.I. 109, 185
A.2d 111 (1962)
R.I.14 G 96 R.I. 358, 191
A.2d 611 (1963)
R.I.15 G 97 R.I. 200, 196
A.2d 829 (1964)
R.I.16 L 99 R.I. 151, 206
A.2d 221 (1965)
R.I.17 G 99 RI. 351, 208
A.2d 105 (1965)
R.I.18 L 99 R.I. 377, 208
A.2d 126 (1965)
R.I.19 L 99 R.I. 382, 208
A.2d 116 (1965)
RI.20 L 99 R.I. 472, 208
A.2d 522 (1965)
R.I.21 G 100 R.I. 175, 212
A.2d 64 (1965)
RLI.22 L 100 R.I. 194, 212
A.2d 647 (1965)
R-I.23 L 100 R-I. 345, 216
A.2d 124 (1966)
R.I.24 G 101 R.I. 203, 221
A.2d 799 (1966)
R.I.25 G 101 R.I. 329, 223
A.2d 76 (1966)
R-I.26 G 106 R.I. 148, 256
A.2d 194 (1969)
R.I.27 L 107 R.I. 77, 264
A.Zd 920 (1970)
RI.28 G 107 R.I. 651, 270
A.2d 520 (1970)
R-I.29 L 108 R-I. 61, 271
A.2d 810 (1970)
R.I.30 L 108 R.I. 149, 272
A.2d 924 (1971)
R.I.31 L 108 R.I. 151, 272
A.2d 925 (1971)
R.I.32 L 108 R-I. 163, 273
A.2d 485 (1971)
R-I.33 L 108 R.I. 302, 275
A.2d 256 (1971)
R-I.34 L 108 R.I. 551, 277
A.2d 750 (1971)
R-1.35 L 108 RI. 628, 278
A.2d 852 (1971)
R.I.36 G 109 R.I. 289, 284
A.2d 295 (1971)
R-I.37 G 109 RI. 474, 287
A.2d 353 (1972)
R-I.38 G 110 RI. 1, 289
A.2d 430 (1972)
R-I.39 G - R.I. -, 303
A-2d 802 (1973)
R.I.40 G - RI. -, 308
A.2d 809 (1973)
South Dakota
S.D.1
S.D.2
S.D.3
S.D.4
S.D.5
G 79 S.D. 585, 116
N.W.2d 233 (1962)
G S0 S.D. 77, 119
N.W.2d 145 (1963)
G 81 S.D. 629, 140
N.W.2d 34 (1966)
G 82 S.D. 500, 149
N.W.2d 326 (1967)
G 83 S.D. 477, 161
N.W.2d 706 (1968)
S.D.6 G 84 S.D. 3, 166
N.W.2d 427 (1969)
S.D.7 G 85 S.D. 390, 182
N.W.2d 849 (1971)
S.D.8 G - S.D. -, 203
N.W.2d 526 (1973)
S.D.9 G - S.D. -, 204
N.W.2d 184 (1973)
S.D. I0 G - S.D. -, 209
N.W.2d 668 (1973)
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B. Submission of Requests
1. Aggregate Use of the Advisory Opinion Mechanism
In the five states in which both the governor and the legislature may
request advisory opinions-Alabama, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire and Rhode Island-a total of 244 requests were submitted to the
justices. 20 Over the fourteen year period, the overall use of the mechanism
increased steadily, reflecting more the practice of the legislature than the
executive. 21 Legislative requests outnumbered gubernatorial requests by a
ratio of more than two to one.
The increase in legislative use of the advisory opinion procedure can be
explained, in part, by several factors, though the prime impetus seems to be
the massive growth in the number of bills introduced into state legislatures,
an increase of forty-seven percent from 1965 (12,200 bills) to 1971 (17,975
bills). 22
In the three states in which only the governor may request opinions-
Delaware, Florida and South Dakota-seventy requests were submitted over
the fourteen years. Over the period, the incidence of requests in these states
remained stable,2 3 as was the case with gubernatorial requests in the previous
group of five states. The Delaware executive, contrary to the trend, steadily
decreased its use of the procedure.
2. Requests as a Response of Requesting Authorities to External Stimuli
An analysis of the factors affecting use of the advisory opinion procedure in
an important area of state concern-reapportionment-illustrates the effect of
extra-state legal pressures in triggering requests. Federal judicial decisions
regarding the constitutional requisites for state legislative apportionment
resulted in numerous references to the justices for advice on how to imple-
ment the new decisions.
In Baker v. Carr, 24 the Supreme Court held justiciable claims alleging that
gross malapportionment of legislative seats violates the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution. Following Baker, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that the apportionment of the state's general assembly was
unconstitutional. The court observed that its decision was motivated in part
20. Approximately one-half of the total number of requests were submitted in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire.
21. The trends were calculated by dividing the twelve years from 1961 through 1972 into
three periods (1961-64, 1965-68 & 1969-72), each of which includes the same number of biennial
sessions for Maine and New Hampshire and, in the case of Alabama, quadrennial sessions of the state
legislature. In this manner, the increase in combined requests in the last period over the first
period was found to be 79%; in legislative requests, 100%; and in gubernatorial requests, 23%.
22. Book of the States 1972-73, at 74-75 (R. Weber ed.); Book of the States 1966-67, at 62-63
(F. Smothers ed.).
23. For 23 years prior to the South Dakota governor's request in 1962, S.D. I, that state's
advisory opinion mechanism was entirely unused; the last preceding opinion was Opinion of the
Judges, 66 S.D. 622, 287 N.W. 581 (1939). See Advisory Opinions in South Dakota, supra note 2,
at 306.
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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by the fact that federal courts were in a position to entertain challenges to
state constitutional provisions regarding apportionment 25 This decision gen-
erated a request from the Rhode Island governor inquiring into the constitu-
tionality of measures adopted by a legislature that had been elected on the
basis of an unconstitutional apportionment scheme. 26 Similarly, in 1962 and
1963, federal district courts in Florida and Delaware voided each state's
statutory and constitutional provisions on apportionment;27 in 1963, the
governors of both states sought advice on the matter from the justices. 28
In 1964, in Reynolds v. Sims, 29 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
the Alabama constitutional provisions on apportionment, declaring that rep-
resentation in state legislatures was to be apportioned on a "one man, one
vote" basis. This new rule produced more requests for advisory opinions
during the fourteen-year period than any other federal case, provoking a total
of at least eleven requests: in Alabama (one), Maine (five), Massachusetts
(three) and Rhode Island (two).30 The last two Maine requests were as recent
as 1971.31
Other Supreme Court reapportionment decisions gave rise to advisory
opinion requests. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 32 the Court explicitly left unde-
cided the constitutionality of reapportionment plans based on numbers of
legal voters rather than general population. 33 This decision resulted in the
submission of "legal voter" plans to the justices in Maine, Massachusetts and
New Hampshire. 34 In 1973, Maine's justices entertained a request for their
opinion 35 on whether a reapportionment plan met the newly promulgated "as
equal as possible" standard set forth by the Court in Mahan v. Howell.36
These Supreme Court decisions, beginning with Baker, mandated a basis
for state legislative apportionment that contradicted the historical standards
of representation in nearly all the states. 37 Moreover, these decisions effec-
tively deprived the states of authority over a subject that always had been
considered an exclusive state concern. 38 As a result, the decisions posed a
dilemma for state legislatures and governors. Faced with the extraordinary
25. Sweeney v. Notte, 95 R.I. 68, 75-76, 82-83, 183 A.2d 296, 300, 303-04 (1962).
26. R.I. 13.
27. Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 184 (D. Del. 1963) (three judge court), aff'd sub
nom. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 317 (S.D. Fla.
1962).
28. D.10; F.4.
29. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
30. A.15; Me.36; Me.35; Me.19; Me.18; Me.12; Mla.20; Mia.19; Ma.12; R.I.29; R.I.24.
31. Me.36; Me.35.
32. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
33. Id. at 534.
34. See Me.27; Ma.35; N.H45.
35. Me.40.
36. 410 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1973), discussed in Note, A Flexible Standard for State Reappor-
tionment Cases, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 641, 641-45 (1974).
37. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 610-11 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 86 (1970).
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legal problem of attempting to apportion according to inconsistent, and
sometimes antithetical demands of state and federal constitutions, the request-
ing authorities turned to the justices for advice. 39
C. Questions: Subject Matter of the Requests
1. Requests in General
During the fourteen years studied, requesting authorities in the eight states
posed a total of 723 questions in the 278 requests accepted by the justices for
consideration. 40 Legislators asked approximately sixty percent of the ques-
tions and governors asked the remainder. 4 1 In the five states in which both
the legislature and governor may submit requests, the governors asked
over seventy percent. Three states-Maine, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire-accounted for four-fifths of the legislators' questions. Only in
Rhode Island did the governor ask more questions and submit more requests
than the legislature. Tables I and II present the number and proportions of ques-
tions asked by the various requesting authorities.
2. Legislative Inquiries
Seventy-three percent of the legislative questions occurred in three of the
six categories developed for observational purposes: 42 individuals' constitu-
tional rights (28%), general governmental mechanics (22%), and state fiscal
problems (23%). The predominance of the individuals' constitutional rights
category was caused by the fact that over thirty percent of the legislators'
questions in Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire fell into this clas-
sification. 43 By contrast, in the other two states in which the legislature may
request advisory opinions-Rhode Island and Alabama-individuals' con-
stitutional rights accounted only for approximately ten and five percent of the
legislatures' inquiries respectively. In addition to the questions concerning
legislative apportionment discussed previously,44 most of the legislatures'
queries regarding individuals' rights occurred in connection with bills provid-
ig aid to sectarian schools and other means of implementing the states' police
power. For example, the justices were requested to assess the impact upon
39. See, e.g., A.15; Me.18; Ma.20; Ma.19; R.I.29; cf. C.11.
40. Since refusals are often resubmitted, only those questions posed in accepted requests were
analyzed to avoid the creation of false numerical importance through redundancy. Compare
Ma.41 with Ma.42, and N.H.34 with N.H.36. Throughout this section "resquests" mean only
those requests entertained by the justices. For observational purposes, the questions are grouped
into six categories according to the constitutional provisions that were the subject of the
requesting authorities' inquiries: individuals' constitutional rights, elections and reapportionment,
governmental power, fiscal problems, general governmental mechanics and miscellaneous. These
groups are defined in the Appendix.
41. The one question asked by the executive council in Massachusetts is not included in this
proportion. Ma.21. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
42. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
43. Maine asked 37% of its questions in this category, Massachusetts 30.5% and New
Hampshire 31.1%.
44. See Pt. II B2 supra.
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TABLE I-LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONS
% of Questions in Group
Number of Questions
% of all Questions
Mass. N.H. Me. Ala. R.I.
128 119 115 67 10
17.7% 16.5% 15.9% 9.3% 1.4%
individuals' constitutional rights of proposed measures dealing with regulation
of insurance companies,45 prohibitions against use of photographic efficiency
studies by private employers: 46 jury reform and the right to a jury tria, 4 7 and
45. See A.33; Ma. 10; Ma.4; cf. Me.3 (milk dealers); Ma.S9 (state employee retirement system);
N.H.59 (no-fault insurance bill).
46. Ma.40 (due process; equal protection); MA.30 (due process; equal protection).
47. Me.34 (sixth amendment); Ma.45 (same); N.H.59 (right to jury in state constitution);
R-I. 35 (sixth and seventh amendments); cf. N.H.35 (right to counsel).
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TABLE I1-GUBERNATORIAL QUESTIONS
22.2%18.7%118.0% 15.5%jl 0.2% 16.3%14.9%14.2%1
N.H. R.I. Del. Fla. Mass. Ala. Me. S.D.
63 53 51 44 29 18 14 12
8.7% 7.3% 7.1% 6.1% 4.0% 2.5% 1.9% 1.7%
use of blood tests to determine drunken driving. 48 Moreover, Supreme Court
decisions restricting the states' use of the police power to impose voting and
welfare residency requirements4 9 prompted additional requests for opinions
containing questions in this category.50
48. Me.24 (fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments; due process).
49. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voter residency requirement held violative of
equal protection clause of Federal Constitution); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(same for welfare residency requirement).
50. Me.38 (voting); Ma.46 (welfare); Ma.36 (same); cf. Me.25 (residency requirement to
possess firearms).
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State fiscal problems constituted the second largest category of legislative
questions."1 In Massachusetts and New Hampshire, more than one-quarter of
the legislatures' questions concerned this area whereas in Alabama and Maine
the percentage was smaller, yet still significant. The questions in this category
primarily concerned the state debt and legislative taxing and spending pow-
ers. For example, the justices were requested to advise on whether bond
issues would violate state debt provisions,5 2 on the legislature's ability to
withdraw unexpended funds from state departments prior to the end of the
fiscal year,5 3 on tax exemptions for certain organizations,5 4 and on public
financing of political campaigns. s"
The third largest classification of legislative questions dealt with "general
governmental mechanics. '5 6 These questions most frequently arose when the
normal course of legislative proceedings was interrupted by an unusual
factual situation presenting an unfamiliar legal problem. For example, in one
case, the justices were asked to advise on the validity of a bill that had not
been signed by the presiding officers of both houses of the legislature. S7 In
other cases, the legislature inquired as to the size of the legislative vote
required to set a date for submission of a constitutional amendment to the
electorate5 8 and the effect of a purported gubernatorial veto after the time for
acting on a bill had lapsed.5 9
The categories of fiscal problems and general governmental mechanics are
similar in that both deal with procedural and practical aspects of operating
the governmental machinery--i.e., passage of legislation and funding of
programs. Because these problems are common to all states, it is not
surprising to find substantial numbers of questions in both categories.
3. Gubernatorial Inquiries
Eighty-two percent of gubernatorial questions occurred in three categories:
general governmental mechanics (36%), governmental power (27%) and fiscal
problems (19%). Two of these categories also were among the three most
active areas of legislative inquiry. 60 Gubernatorial questions in the gov-
51. See Appendix infra. This category constituted 16% in Alabama (11 questions); 14% in
Maine (16 questions); 27% in Massachusetts (34 questions); 27% in New Hampshire (32
questions); 40% in Rhode Island (4 questions).
52. A. 14; cf. R.I.32 (borrowing on anticipated tax receipts and other sources). See also Me.7
(method of issuing bonds).
53. R.I.33; cf. Me.2 (private damage payment made from highway fund).
54. Ma.23; cf. Me.11; Ma.3; Ma.2. These requests also contained questions as to whether the
classification violated the equal protection clause.
55. Ma.24; Ma.9; Ma.7.
56. See Appendix infra. This category amounted to 36% in Alabama (24 questions); 19% in
Maine (22 questions); 23% in Massachusetts (30 questions); 17% in New Hampshire (20
questions); 40% in Rhode Island (4 questions).
57. A.3.
58. N.H.47; cf. Me.15 (size of vote needed to override veto); Me.16 (size of vote needed to
pass emergency legislation).
59. Ma.16; cf. Me.29 (validity of veto of resolution for constitutional amendment); Me.21
(validity of veto of bill with a referendum clause).
60. See Pt. II C2 supra.
1975]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
ernmental mechanics category 6' paralleled those of the legislatures. Ordinar-
ily, these questions arose when the executive, in the exercise of his duties, was
confronted with extraordinary legal or factual circumstances, often involving
the interrelationship between the executive and the legislature. 62 Some
questions concerned the procedure for calling special legislative sessions 63 and
the effect of bills that, through accident or clerical mistake, were missing
necessary legislative signatures. 64 Others concerned the effective dates of
statutes or constitutional amendments, 65 the voting privileges of the president
pro tempore of the state senate66 and the percentage legislative majority needed
to amend the state's general corporation law.67
The second largest category of gubernatorial questions was governmental
powers. 68 In these questions, governors sought advice as to the power of the
various branches of government to take certain action. The inquiries usually
concerned aspects of the executive appointment power-e.g., length and termi-
nation of appointees' terms 69 and eligibility of particular candidates for ap-
pointment. 70 In addition, governors posed questions in this category as to their
power to close schools disturbed by racial violence, 7 1 to pardon criminals, 72 and
to accept testamentary gifts to the state. 73
Fiscal problems comprised the third largest category of gubernatorial
questions. This resulted from the fact that almost one-half of all the Rhode
Island governors' inquiries were within this classification; in the other states,
the category formed only a small proportion of gubernatorial questions. 74
61. See Appendix infra. This category was 11% of the gubernatorial questions in Alabama
(2 questions); 63% in Delaware (32 questions); 36% in Florida (16 questions); 14% in Maine (2
questions); 31% in Massachusetts (9 questions); 41% in New Hampshire (26 questions); 19% in Rhode
Island (10 questions); 50% in South Dakota (6 questions).
62. For example questions with respect to exercise of the gubernatorial power. D.32; D. 14;
F.1; Ma. 19.
63. F.12; Ma.27.
64. F.5 (death of required signatory prevented compliance); S.D.6 (unsigned by presiding
officer of house); cf. N.H.20 (bill not engrossed).
65. E.g., D.9 (constitutional amendment); D.7 (act amending state constitution); Ma.53
(amendment); cf. Me.5 (amendment submitted to electorate on wrong date).
66. D.16; cf. D.23 (basis for finding quorum).
67. D.17.
68. See Appendix infra. This category comprised 50% of the gubernatorial questions in
Alabama (9 questions); 10% in Delaware (5 questions); 50% in Florida (22 questions); 43% in
Maine (6 questions); 28% in Massachusetts (8 questions); 32% in New Hampshire (20 questions);
8% in Rhode Island (4 questions); 33% in South Dakota (4 questions),
69. D.6; Me.28; Ma.34; N.H.54. See also Me.42 (conflicting statutes on governor's appoint-
ment power).
70. A.17; Ma.11 (appointment of judge to different position with a higher salary); S.D.I
(eligibility of governor or lieutenant governor for interim appointment as a United States
Senator).
71.' A.10.
72. S.D.5.
73. N.H.30; cf. F.10 (privately donated funds for law enforcement). See also N.H.28
(governor's power to grant emergency funds to school district).
74. This category encompassed 6% of the gubernatorial questions in Alabama (1 question); 8%
STATE ADVISORY OPINIONS
Frequently, executives' queries in this area concerned the issuance of bonds
by public authorities. 75
Governors asked only eighteen questions involving individuals' constitu-
tional rights. Ten of these were asked by the governors of Massachusetts and
New Hampshire, two of the three states in which the legislators asked a
significant number of such questions. 76
The subject matter of the questions asked by the governors in the five states
in which both the executive and the legislature may request advisory opinions
did not vary significantly in subject matter from those posed by the governors
in the three states in which only the executive may solicit the justices' advice.
One category in which there was some difference, however, was general
governmental mechanics: governors in the three states seem to have inquired
into some matters with which the legislatures in the other five states, rather
than the governors, were concerned. 77 This may indicate that parallel situa-
tions arise, generating questions as to general governmental mechanics and
creating similar problems for governors and legislators into which the legisla-
tures of the three states would have inquired if they had the power to request
advisory opinions.
D. The Justices' Treatment of Requests and Questions
1. Jurisdiction
Prior to 1972, statutory or constitutional provisions in seven of the eight
states included in this study appeared to require that the justices answer all
requests that satisfied constitutional or statutory requirements. 78 In addition,
the language of the Alabama statute seemed to impose a duty upon the
justices to" answer requests conforming to the statutory standards. 79 That
state's justices, however, have interpreted the statute to grant the power, but
not to impose the duty, to render advisory opinions.80 Commentators have
maintained that, irrespective of firm statutory or constitutional dictate, the
justices in all states have defined their advisory function so as to create a
in Delaware (4 questions); 14% in Florida (6 questions); 21% in Maine (3 questions); 10% in
Massachusetts (3 questions); 14% in New Hampshire (9 questions); 49% in Rhode Island (26
questions). South Dakota had one such question.
75. RI.40 (Housing and Mortgage Finance Corp.); R.I.39 (Public Buildings Aulthority);
R.I.38 (Land Development Corp.); R.I.28 (Water Resources Board); R.I.25 (Recreational Build-
ing Authority); R.I. 17 (Turnpike and Bridge Authority); cf. R.I.21 (guarantee of mortgage loans
by Industrial Building Authority).
76. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
77. Compare D.23, D.16, F.5, and S.D.6, with A.3, Me.16, Me.15 and N.H.47.
78. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141 (1953), as amended, Del. Code Ann. tiL 10, § 141 (1975)
("shall give"); Fla. Const. art. IV, § 1(c) ("shall render"); Me. Const. art. VI, § 3 ("shall be
obliged"); Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. 2, § 83 ("require"); N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 74
("required"); R.I. Const. amend. XII, § 2 ("shall... give whenever requested"); S.D. Const. art.
V, § 5 ("required").
79. Ala. Code tit. 13, § 34 (1959) (governor or legislature "may obtain written opinion of the
justices"); Advisory Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9, at 8.
80. Opinion of the Justices, 266 Ala. 370, 96 So. 2d 752, 753 (1957); Advisory Opinions in
Alabama, supra note 9, at 5.
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power to refuse to answer otherwise proper requests under a variety of
circumstances. 8 1 Delaware appears to have codified this alleged prior practice
in a 1972 amendment to its enabling statute. The amendment rephrased the
previously mandatory language8 2 so as to expressly give the justices full
discretion to refuse to render advice even in the case of questions that meet
the statutory criteria.8 3
2. Restrictions Imposed by the Justices on the Advisory Mechanism
It is clear that the justices have developed methods to avoid giving advisory
opinions. In refusing to entertain requests, or to answer specific questions
within requests, the justices have developed three broad rules or categories of
objections: the issue presented is hypothetical or abstract; it would be judi-
cially uneconomical to render an answer; or an answer would affect private
interests.
Requests submitted to the justices are deemed hypothetical when the
subject matter of a request is not pending before the requesting authority.8 4
Such inquiries are unrelated to any presently proposed course of governmen-
tal action; consequently an advisory opinion would be purely academic.8 5
This rationale for declining to entertain requests has been the primary reason
for the rejection of legislative requests concerning already-enacted statutes.8 6
In related circumstances, the justices have labelled moot those requests
respecting subject matter pending before the requesting authority at the time
of the request but not at the time of the justices' deliberations.8 7 This occurs
most frequently when the legislature adjourns sine die after submission of the
request to, but before its consideration by, the justices.88 Similarly, the
justices have refused to answer questions in a request that they deem have
been rendered moot by a response to another question in the same request.8 9
The second principal reason that justices have given for refusing to answer
requests is that the burden on the justices would be greater than the benefit
conferred on the requesting authority. This "judicial economy" rationale has
been advanced primarily in refusals to answer "broad and indefinite ques-
tions." 90 That is, when a question is phrased too broadly, the justices may
have to assume an unacceptably heavy burden in answering it completely. 9'
81. Colorado Advisory Opinion Clause, supra note 9, at 250; Comment, The Advisory
Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 94, 100-01 (1936); see Note,
The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 Geo. L.J. 785, 811 (1962);
Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 99-108; Stevens, supra note 1, at 4-5.
82. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
83. Codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141 (1975).
84. A.31; Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 104-05; Advisory Opinions in Alabama,
supra note 9, at 18.
85. A.31; A.29. This objection is closely related to the judicial economy rationale. See notes
90-91 infra and accompanying text.
86. R.I.34; R.I.27; R.I.23; R.I.22; Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 103.
87. A.24; R.I.31; R.I.30; R.I.29.
88. R.I.31; R.I.30; R.I.29; R.I.16; see Advisory Opinions on Statutes, supra note 2, at 1308.
89. See, e.g., A.9; D.14; F.22; Me.17; Ma.47; N.H.11; R.I.2; S.D.6.
90. A.38; R.I.34; R.I.18.
91. R.I. 18.
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Under the third type of objection, the justices will not render opinions if it
appears that an answer would affect private interests.92 Pursuant to this rule, the
justices will not answer questions concurrently at issue in litigation. 9 3 Nor will
the justices, in the context of an advisory opinion, perform such "judicial"
functions as making findings of fact or "overruling" prior court decisions. 94 Since
the opinion would be highly persuasive it might foreclose issues on which
interested parties in future litigation would not have had full opportunity to be
heard. Florida's justices explained the rationale for this rule:
An answer [would] affect directly the rights of individuals against whom it is
contemplated the [executive] power will be exercised .... These individuals are not
parties to this nonadversary proceeding. An opinion without their participation would
deny to them a traditional aspect of due process-the right to be heard. 9s
One commentator has questioned the soundness of such a rule, noting that every
governmental action affects some private rights and, if the rule were followed
strictly, no advisory opinion ever could issue. 96 In fact, it appears that the rule
actually is aimed at those situations in which the governmental action in question
will have an intense and direct effect upon a small group of people. 97
3. Application of the Justices' Objections
During the fourteen year period studied, the justices in the eight states under
analysis refused to entertain thirty-six of the 314 requests submitted. 98 Ten were
refusals of gubernatorial requests. Notably, refusals of seven Alabama and ten
Rhode Island legislative requests accounted for almost half of all refusals. Of the
total, sixteen were due to the hypothetical question rule-seven of these were by
Rhode Island's justices. 99 Five refusals, each from a different state, fell within
the "affecting private interests" category.' 0 0 Application of the judicial economy
rationale resulted in eight refusals: six in Alabama and two in Rhode Island.10
92. Ma.55; S.D.7; Clovis, supra note 3, at 191; Advisory Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9,
at 20; Stevens, supra note 1, at 5; Advisory Opinions in Florida, supra note 3, at 331.
93. N.H. 13; Advisory Opinions in South Dakota, supra note 2, at 297; Stevens, supra note 1,
at 1-3 & n.7; see A.2.
94. Me.3; R.I.14; Advisory Opinions in South Dakota, supra note 2, at 297; Stevens, supra
note 1, at 5; see F.9; Advisory Opinions in Florida, supra note 3, at 331.
95. F.9 at 739.
96. Advisory Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9, at 22.
97. Advisory Opinions in Florida, supra note 3, at 331.
98. The total number of refusals does not include requests made by the executive council in
Massachusetts that the justices declined to entertain. Ma.15; Ma.54. See note 4 supra. The
gubernatorial refusal rates were Alabama 33% (3 refusals); Delaware 3% (1 refusal); Mas-
sachusetts 7% (1 refusal); New Hampshire 4% (1 refusal); Rhode Island 9% (2 refusals); South
Dakota 20% (2 refusals); see Appendix, infra. There were no refusals of gubernatorial requests
in Florida and Maine. The legislative refusal rates were 22% in Alabama (7 refusals); 11% in
Maine (4 refusals); 7% in Massachusetts (3 refusals); 5% in New Hampshire (2 refusals); 59% in
Rhode Island (10 refusals). Id.
99. A.24; Me.36; Me.35; Me.15; Ma.58; Ma.48; Ma.41; N.H.34; RI.31; R-1.30; .I1.29;
R.I.27; R.I.23; R-I.22; R.I.16; S.D.10; cf. N.H.31 (withdrawn request not answered); see notes
84-89 supra and accompanying text.
100. A.2; Me.3; N.H.13; R.I.14; S.D.7; see notes 92-97 supra and accompanying text.
101. A.38; A.36; A.31; A.27; A.23; A.22; R.I.34; R.I.18.
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Four of these Alabama refusals arose from a policy of the justices of that state to
decline to entertain requests concerning the constitutionality of local laws, 12 "in
order that the members of [the] [c]ourt can devote themselves to the preparation
of opinions in the large number of cases which come [to the court] by appeal and
to answering requests for advisory opinions concerning proposed legislation of
statewide application.' 10 3 The other four refusals were based on judicial
economy being characterized by the justices as too "broad and indefinite."' 0 4
What is broad and indefinite seems to vary from state to state. At one extreme,
Alabama and Rhode Island insist that the requesting authority identify the
particular constitutional provision with which the proposal may be in conflict. 10-1
At the other, New Hampshire's justices frequently answer questions that merely
ask whether the proposal is constitutional. ' 06
Of the six refusals of requests that did not fit within the three broad
categories of objections, five were rejected for being clearly outside the
justices' advisory opinion jurisdiction. In three of these, the requesting branch
improperly sought the justices' advice on behalf of an unauthorized party;0 7
in the other two, refusal resulted from the submission of requests not dealing
with a constitutional question' 0 -a statutory requirement for the exercise of
the justices' jurisdiction in Alabama and Delaware. 10 9 The sixth unclassified
refusal was a common-sense denial by the Rhode Island justices of a request
for advice on proposed legislation when, apparently inadvertently, only the
title of the bill was submitted for consideration. 1 0
The justices answered 84 percent of the 723 separate questions asked in
accepted requests. Of the 116 questions not answered, 83 were due to the
justices' determination that a response to a different question contained in the
same request had rendered the unanswered question moot. In addition, the
justices refused to answer twenty-nine questions for the same three broad
objections that motivated the overwhelming majority of their refusals to
entertain requests."'
The justices declined to answer the remaining four questions for reasons
that are less clear than those discussed above. In Massachusetts, two ques-
tions that presented "constitutional issues of great difficulty" were not
answered because the justices were reluctant to respond "without full deliber-
ation or without receiving briefs from interested persons." 12 In addition, the
102. A.36; A.27; A.23; A.22. The justices will, however, answer questions as to whether a
particular bill is a local law. See Appendix infra.
103. A.23 at 104.
104. A.38; A.31; R.I.34; R.I.18.
105. A.31; R.I.18. But see R.I.35 (question phrased broadly but since constitutional sections
involved were clearly implied justices answered).
106. E.g., N.H.48; N.H.42; N.H.33; see N.H.36 (question number 5). Such questions
comprised 16% of the questions in New Hampshire-accepted legislative requests,
107. A.29; Ma.32; R.I.36.
108. A.11; D.33.
109. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
110. R.I. 10.
111. See notes 99-106 supra and accompanying text.
112. Ma.19 at 716.
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Maine and Massachusetts justices each refused to answer a question on a
federal constitutional issue about which the law was entirely unresolved. The
justices reasoned that their advice would be of minimal utility to the request-
ing authority, since it would not be based on any authoritative Supreme
Court decisions but rather on the justices' intuition and prognostication
regarding future resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court."13
Occasionally, the justices went beyond the questions addressed in order to
point out potential conflicts between proposed legislation and constitutional
provisions about which no inquiry was made." 4 Moreover, the justices have
suggested to the legislature how to redraft a submitted proposal to meet their
criticisms.1 15 It has been warned, however, that in going beyond their
advisory function, "the justices should be careful not to assume the legislative
function of selecting an appropriate method for achieving the legislative
goal."' 1 6 Although the justices' suggestions for redrafting bills may result in
sounder statutes, the danger exists that judicial involvement in the formula-
tion of legislation, removed as it is from the legislative fact-finding task, will
result in a loss of governmental flexibility in dealing with the social problems
at which statutes are aimed." 7
4. Observations
The rationales that the justices have constructed for refusing requests and
questions are grounded in sound policy. Perhaps with the exception of those
requests that were refused due to their effect on private rights, every
declination could have been foreseen by the requesting authority. The
explanation for the high refusal rates in Alabama (24%) and Rhode Island
(30%) apparently lies in the inability or unwillingness of those in the state
legislature who frame the requests to understand the rather mechanical
limitations that the justices have placed on use of the advisory opinion
mechanism.
There is no reason why judicial resources should be expended in refusing
improperly submitted requests. Since it is clear that such requests regarding
enacted statutes or local laws vill be refused, legislative advisory opinion
procedures should be tightened to filter out those requests doomed to failure
from inception.
III. CONCLUSION
Advisory opinions are primarily concerned with the internal operations of
government. While legislative requests significantly outnumbered gubernato-
113. Me.27; Ma.13.
114. E.g., A.40; A. 15; Ma. 12; RI-.37. But see Ma.38 (justices noted additional constitutional
problems but refused to discuss them; limited answer to specific inquiry).
115. Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 571 (Mass. 1974); Ma. 56; N.H.24. For a
discussion of courts' use of dictum in ordinary litigation for the same purpose see Albertsworth,
Advisory Functions in Federal Supreme Court, 23 Geo. L.J. 643, 650-56 (1935). See also Kauper,
The Supreme Court: Hybrid Organ of State, 21 Sw. L.J. 573, 584-85 (1967) (informal constitu-
tional revision by interpretation and construction by Supreme Court).
116. Advisory Opinions on Statutes, supra note 2, at 1310.
117. Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 112-13.
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rial requests, the questions of both branches of government were predomi-
nantly concerned with internal governmental mechanics and fiscal respon-
sibilities." 18 The only material difference in their respective requests was that
governors had a significant number of requests concerning governmental
power and a rather insignificant number of requests in regard to individuals'
constitutional rights, while the converse was true of legislative inquiries.
While advisory opinions have been primarily concerned with the internal
workings of state government, they have not been unaffected by extra-state
legal pressure as evidenced by the apportionment cases discussed above. It
should also be noted, however, that such extra-state pressure may actually
result in a reluctance of state justices to render advisory opinions on such
matters, especially where the federal law is unclear and its ultimate direction
is still developing.' 9
Procedural reform of the mechanism, particularly the greater involvement
of counsel in presenting the issues to the justices, occurred throughout the
period studied. In at least five states, submission of briefs by interested parties
has been provided for by statute or has become standard procedure. 20 In at
118. This finding answers to a limited degree a theoretical argument offered by opponents of
the advisory opinion mechanism. These commentators have argued that the availability of the
mechanism may encourage the legislature to avoid its obligation to determine independently the
compatibility of a proposed measure with constitutional provisions. Advisory Opinions in
Alabama, supra note 9, at 38; see Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1002, 1007 (1924) [hereinafter cited as A Note on Advisory Opinions]. This duty is similar to that
imposed by the U.S. Const. art. VI, on federal officers. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. XVI, § 279;
Colo. Const. art. XII, §§ 7, 8; Del. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Fla. Const. art. 2, § 5(b); Me. Const.
art. IX, § 1; Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. I; N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 84; S.D. Const. art. XXI, §
3. Consequently the justices must decide whether a proposed act is constitutional without the
implied decision to that effect that accompanies enacted legislation. The finding that well over
two-thirds of the requests for advisory opinions contain no questions as to constitutionality of a
proposed action, but rather seek advice regarding procedural workings of state government,
effectively limits the effectiveness of such an argument.
119. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
120. An Alabama statute empowers the justices to request amicus briefs from interested parties.
Ala. Code tit. 13, § 36 (1958). This authority seldom has been used. Advisory Opinions in Alabama,
supra note 9, at 32-33. In 1972, Delaware amended its statute to give the justices discretion to appoint
members of the Delaware bar "for the purpose of briefing or arguing the legal issues submitted .... "
Codified as Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 141(b) (1975). Rules promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court
allow the justices to permit "interested persons to be heard on the questions presented through briefs
or oral argument or both." Fla. App. Ct. R. 2. lh(2)(b) (1975). In New Hampshire, the justices appear
to have adopted the solicitation of briefs from interested parties as a standard practice. See, e.g.,
Opinion oftheJustices, 114 N.H. 165, 316 A.2d 174 (1974); Opinion oftheJustices, 109 N.H. 366, 252
A.2d 429 (1969). The justices in New Hampshire occasionally hear oral arguments in advisory
opinion proceedings. Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 205, 304 A.2d 881 (1973); Opinion of the
Justices, 102 N.H. 565, 163 A.2d 1, 2 (1960); Note, The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal
Judiciary, 50 Geo. L.J. 785, 792 (1962). On at least one occasion, New Hampshire's justices have
refused to answer a request until interested parties had an opportunity to submit their views. Opinion
of theJustices, 109 N.H. 473, 475, 254 A.2d 845, 846 (1969). And in Massachusetts, the use of briefs
by the justices has become a common practice since 1967, when the justices abandoned historical
practice by requesting the submission of briefs to aid in the preparation of their response to a complex
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least one other state, submission of briefs has been used on occasion.' 2 1
Although this practice1 22 probably has resulted in sounder opinions in some
instances, it also may have produced some unexpected consequences. First,
submission of briefs and presence of counsel have lent an increasingly judicial
flavor to the advisory opinion procedure, further blurring the already impre-
cise distinction between decisions of the court and opinions of the justices.
Absence of briefs and counsel has been a primary reason for the justices'
self-imposed refusal to deal with requests that would affect private rights. It
is apparent, however, that employment of these aids to decision-making may
result in the elimination of the refusal to deal with such requests. It is clear
that submission of briefs by some interested parties cannot ensure that all
relevant views will be represented. A reform aimed at correcting a weakness
in the advisory opinion procedure may therefore result incidentally in expan-
sion of the justices' advisory jurisdiction. For example, Massachusetts' gover-
nor requested the justices' advice on the state's obligation to pay rent to
private landlords under a lease executed by the state university.' 2 The justices
answered although it was a situation in which a response obviously would
affect the private interest of the landlords. Acknowledging their departure
from the traditional rule, the justices explained:
Where private rights are involved, such as the rights of [these] landlords .... it would
normally be inappropriate for us to give an opinion on a matter of statutory
construction which could be brought to the court by the usual litigation process,
initiated by the parties in interest . . . Here, however, the answers we give are not
adverse to any landlord and are directed solely to questions of law of continuing
importance, which have been fully argued to us in carefully considered briefs.'
Despite their caveat that this case should not be viewed as establishing a
precedent, it seems clear that the justices effectually expanded their advisory
jurisdiction due to the presence of legal briefs, but without the other benefits
reapportionment question. Opinion of the Justices, 353 Mass. 790, 793, 230 N.E.2d 801,803 (1967);
see, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. -, - , 311 N.E.2d 44, 45 (1974); Opinion of the
Justices, - Mass. , , 303 N.E.2d 320, 327 n.13 (1973).
121. E.g., R.I.37.
122. This practice effectively disposes of a theoretical argument against advisory opinions.
Opponents of the mechanism argue that the absence of litigating attoreys may leave unconsid-
ered by the justices issues and points of law that would have been brought to their attention in an
adversarial setting. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); C. Wright, Federal Courts
37 (2d ed. 1970); Emery, Advisory Opinions fromJustices, 2 Me. L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1908); see Advisory
Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9, at 2 1. See generally Neef& Nagel, The Adversary Nature of the
American Legal System from a Historical Perspective, 20 N.Y.L.F. 123 (1974). Opponents further
maintain that the concomitant absence of legal briefs increases the burdens on the justices by
requiring them to do their own research. Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion,
4 Ohio St. L.J. 21, 47-48 (1937); Emery, Advisory Opinions from Justices, 2 Me. L. Rev. 1, 4
(1908); Advisory Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9, at 33. The practice in several states has blunted
or mooted both of these contentions. See note 120 supra.
123. Ma.55.
124. Id. at 351-52.
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of the litigation process that frequently have been extolled in the context of
the "case or controversy" limitation on federal court jurisdiction. 125
The benefits and liabilities of the advisory opinion mechanism become
readily apparent if the subject matter of advisory opinions is divided into
three groups: internal governmental affairs; facial constitutionality of legisla-
tion; and legislation the constitutionality of which can be determined only on
its application to particular facts. In the first group would fall three of the
categories developed for observational purposes-general governmental
mechanics, fiscal problems and governmental powers126-containing the vast
majority of questions asked in advisory opinion requests.127 It is in dealing
with problems of internal governmental affairs that the mechanism seems to
be of greatest assistance to the requesting authority. These questions fre-
quently concern problems of governmental structure or procedural difficulties
between the executive and legislative branches, such as the governor's veto
power. 128 Often what is important is not the substance of the justices' answer
but the fact that there is an answer that the contending parties can accept as
conclusive. It is also important that an answer be provided quickly to limit
the adverse ramifications on governmental order caused by the presence of the
problem and resultant indecision. There seem to be no valid objections to
advisory opinions of this nature. 129
The second group, facial constitutionality of legislation, includes issues that
do not require fully developed factual settings for resolution: for example,
whether a reapportionment plan violates the equal protection clause or
whether the reduction in size of a criminal jury violates the sixth amendment.
If counsel is allowed to represent interested parties, the only valid objection to
the use of advisory opinions for such matters is the possibility that the justices
would have too little time for deliberation, particularly in the case of a
legislative request submitted near the end of a session. 130 One must assume,
however, that the justices will not venture an answer on important issues
unless they have taken sufficient time to fully consider their response.
125. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968); United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S.
146, 157 (1961). At the same time, the justices seem to have adopted impliedly the position that they
would abandon the "affects private interests" limitation on their advisory opinion jurisdiction only
when their advice would affect private persons in a favorable manner. Ma.55 at 351-52. This Is
appropriate because, if the private persons brought suit subsequent to an adverse advisory
determination on the same subject matter, the advisory opinion would stand as strong persuasive
authority against their contentions, in effect foreclosing their opportunity to be heard in court.
Conversely, although an opinion adverse to the government would not prevent the requesting
authority from bringing a suit in court on the same matter, see notes 6-9 supra and accompanying
text, the requesting authority at least had the election of asking the justices' advice or testing the issue
in court and, having chosen the former, should have been prepared for adverse conse-
quences.
126. See Appendix infra.
127. See Pt. II C2 & 3 supra.
128. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
129. But see A Note on Advisory Opinions, supra note 118, at 1008 n.18.
130. See notes 133-38 infra and accompanying text.
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In the last group-legislative measures, the application of which would be
unconstitutional in a particular factual situation-advisory opinions are of
limited value and, possibly, may be harmful.' 3 1 The justices cannot be
expected to imagine all possible applications of the proposed act for purposes
of determining its constitutionality in each situation which might ultimately
arise under it. All they can reasonably be expected to do is to judge the bill's
facial constitutionality, leaving for future litigation the constitutionality of the
act as applied.'
32
The effectiveness of advisory opinions in the first two areas is further
enhanced by the rapidity with which advisory opinions can be obtained from
the justices.1 3 3 A 1949 study found that the average time between request and
answer in Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and South
Dakota was less than a month, far shorter than litigation on similar points.134
A more recent study in Florida demonstrated the elapsed time to be seven and
one-half days. 135 Opponents of the procedure cite these figures to support the
proposition that the justices do not spend enough time for careful delibera-
tion.' 36 It appears, however, that when there has been insufficient time for a
thorough analysis, the justices simply have refused to answer.,3 7 Perhaps in
order to insure that enough time will be available to consider requests,
Florida's court rules now provide that an answer shall not be returned until
ten days after the request is filed and docketed unless "such delay would
cause public injury.' 138
Apart from the fundamental political arguments that traditionally have
been advanced against the advisory opinion mechanism,' 3 9 there seem to be
two principal reasons why the number of states utilizing the practice is not
131. See Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 114.
132. See Ma. 10; R.I.24; Cf. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
Yale L.J. 1363, 1373 (1973).
133. Advisory Opinion Analysis, supra note 2, at 221; Stevens, supra note 1, at 13.
134. Advisory Opinion Analysis, supra note 2, at 207.
135. Id. at 337.
136. Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 Ohio St. L.J. 21, 47 (1937);
Advisory Opinions in Alabama, supra note 9, at 33-35. See generally Reisman, Accelerating
Advisory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 648, 662 (1974).
137. E.g., In re House Bill No. 1503, 163 Colo. 45, 47, 428 P.2d 75, 77 (1967); Opinion of the
Justices, 114 N.H. 174, 178, 317 A.2d 568, 572 (1974); Ellingwood, supra note 1, at 219-21.
138. Fla. App. Ct. R. 2.1h(3) (1975).
139. In addition to the arguments discussed in note 122, as well as note 11 and the ac-
companying text, there are other theoretical or political arguments advanced against advisory
opinions. While these objections are beyond the scope of this Comment, they do deserve mention at
this point. The principal objection to advisory opinions is that they infringe upon the separation of
powers doctrine. See Stevens, supra note 1, at 9-10 and cases cited in n.51. See generally A.
Vanderbilt, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Its Present Day Significance 1-51 (1963).
Another theoretical objection is that advisory opinions do not permit legislation to first be tested in
actual practice. A Note on Advisory Opinions, supra note 118; see Davison, The Constitutionality
and Utility of Advisory Opinions, 2 U. Tbronto L.J. 254, 263 (1938). A final theoretical objection is
the difficulty of determining the application of constitutional classifications in the absence of a factual
background. Ma.10; Ma.4; Massachusetts Survey, supra note 9, at 110-11.
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likely to increase. First, the mechanism has not been the focus of public
attention, in large part because the subject matter of requests overwhelmingly
has dealt with the internal workings of state government. 140 Unlike other
procedural devices, such as class actions that may involve major segments of
the private economy, the substance of the justices' advice has made no such
dramatic impact on public consciousness. Furthermore, the jurisdictions that
currently have an advisory opinion procedure are predominantly rural and
sparsely populated.' 4 1 Since they do not face the massive social and legal
problems confronted by the industrial states, their experiences have been
unpersuasive in encouraging greater acceptance of the device.
A second reason why more states have not adopted an advisory opinion
mechanism is the decline in importance of state government, 142 with a
corresponding expansion of federal law into areas that previously had been
areas solely of state concern.1 43 Recognizing this, the justices sometimes have
refused to answer inquiries within their advisory jurisdiction because the
issues dealt with unclear areas of federal law on which they reasoned that
their advice would be of little value. 144 This expansion of the federal role
coupled with the relatively narrow scope of the procedure makes it unlikely
that other states will adopt the advisory opinion mechanism in the future.
Charles M. Carberry
APPENDIX 1: SUMMARIES OF ADVISORY OPINIONS BY STATE-
REQUESTS, DENIALS AND, QUESTIONS
This Appendix summarizes the number of requests for advisory opinions, the number
of times the justices refused to entertain requests and the number of questions in requests
entertained by the justices in each state and in each year during the period 1960-73. Each
column is subdivided to show requests and questions from the legislature (L) and tile
governor (G) and the total (T). For observational purposes, the questions have been
classified in six broad categories:
CATEGORY I: Individuals' Constitutional Rights.-conflicts between proposed
measures and guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment and
the contract clause of the Federal Constitution and in analogous provisions of state
constitutions. (18.8% of all questions.)
CATEGORY II: Elections and Reapportionment. -state legislative apportionment
and election procedure. Of the sixty-six questions in this category, twenty-two were
contained in two lengthy requests from the Maine legislature concerning the technical
issue of the validity of election ballots marked in a particular way. Me. 14; Me. 10. (9.7%
of all questions.)
CATEGORY III: Governmental Powers. -authority to implement a specific course of
140. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
141. The states rendering advisory opinions, ranked by population are: Ala. (2 1st); Del. (46th);
Fla. (9th); Me. (38th); Mass. (10th); N.H. (41st); R.I. (39th); S.D. (44th). See The Book of the States
1974-75, at 538, 545, 546, 556, 558, 566, 576, 578 (P. Albright ed, 1974).
142. See Keefe, The Functions and Powers of the State Legislature, in State Legislatures In
American Politics 37 (A. Heard ed. 1966).
143. See P. Kurland, Politics, the Constitution, and the Warren Court 59-97 (1970).
144. See Me.27; Ma.13.
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action: principally, delegation of legislative power and the exercise of gubernatorial
appointment power. (15.0% of all questions.)
CATEGORY IV: Fiscal Problens.--expenditures, taxing power, governmental
financing and state debt. (20.1% of all questions.)
CATEGORY V: General Governmental Mechanics.-technical governmental op-
erations, including home rule provisions, separation of powers of state governmental
branches, legislative quorum and voting requirements, etc. In addition, this category
includes those questions in which the justices were requested to interpret specific words of
state constitutions and statutes, such as the meaning of the word"mileage" for purposes of
reimbursement of state officers' driving expenses. E.g., C.7; cf. A.25 (meaning of "office
for profit"); N.H.32 (meaning of word "town"). (29.4% of all questions.)
CATEGORY VI: Miscellaneous. -in addition to a minute number of questions that
did not fit within the preceding five categories, two states had peculiarly local advisory
opinion questions that are listed here. 28.2 percent of the questions in Alabama were
miscellaneous, nearly all of which dealt with Ala. Const. art. 4, §§ 45, 104-11, which
require that bills be limited to a single subject and that local laws meet certain special
requirements. See A. 18; A. 14; A. 13; A.5. In New Hampshire, twelve percent of all
questions were within the miscellaneous category, almost all of which concerned the
facial constitutionality of proposed measures, a type of question not acceptable in the
other states. See note 130 supra. (Including these Alabama and New Hampshire
questions, this category accounted for seven percent of all questions; without these
questions, less than two percent of all questions were miscellaneous.)
It should also be noted that in those instances in which judgment required a
determination as to which category a particular question belonged when there were
several alternatives, the question was placed according to what appeared to be the
primary thrust of the inquiry.
Summary No. 1: Alabama
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I 11 I1 IV V VI
Year LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT
1961 2 1 3 0 1 1 2 0 2 O0 0 0 00 0 00 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1963 42 6 0 00 106 16 00 0 1 0 1 12 3 4 1 S 0 0 0 4 3 7
1964 01 1 0 11 0 0 0 00 0 0 000 00 0 00 0oo 00 0
1965 5 1 6 0 0 0 18 3 21 1 0 1 202 03 3 60 6 4 0 4 50 5
1967 7 0 7 3 0 3 17 0 17 0 0 0 0 00 0 00 1 0 1 10 0 10 6 0 6
1968 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 2 2 00 0
1969 2 1 3 1 0 1 1 3 4 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 03 3
1970 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 0 00
1971 7 0 7 2 0 2 8 0 8 1 0 1 000 60 6 0 0 0 20 2 1 0 1
1972 1 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 5 00 0 0 00 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0o
1973 4 1 5 1 0 1 4 4 8 1 0 1 0 00 14 S 00 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
Totals 32 9 41 7 3 10 67 18 85 3 0 3 3 0 3 8 9 17 11 1 12 24 2 26 18 6 24
No Requests in 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1966
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
Summary No. 2: Colorado
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I H I IV V VI
Year L GT LGT LG T LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LG T
1960 01 1 011 00 0 00 0 000
1964 1 0 1 000 1 0 1 000 1 0 1
1965 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 3
1967 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 7 7 000 0 7 7
1969 2 0 2 000 40 4 000 4 0 4
1970 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 3 2 0 2 1 0 1
1972 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 0 0 0
Totals 7 4 11 0 2 2 15 7 22 6 0 6 9 7 16
No Requests in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1971 and 1973
Summary No. 3: Delaware
Categories of Questions
Denials of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I H III IV V VI
Year LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT
1961 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 6 0
1962 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 0
1963 5 0 7 0 2 1 0 4 0
1964 3 0 7 0 1 2 0 4 0
1965 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0
1966 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 2 0
1967 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0
1968 4 0 8 1 0 1 3 2 1
1969 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0
1970 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1971 3 0 3 1 0 0 0 2 0
1972 2 0 4 1 2 0 0 1 0
1973 4 1 4 0 0 1 0 3 0
Totals 34 1 51 4 5 5 4 32 I
No Requests in 1960
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Summary No. 4: Florida
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests* Posed I II III IV V Vi
Year LG T LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT
1961 3 0 3 1 0 2
1963 3 0 3 2 0 1
1965 1 0 3 2 0 1
1966 1 0 1 1 0 0
1967 3 0 4 3 0 1
1968 5 0 5 4 0 1
1969 3 0 6 3 0 3
1970 2 0 5 2 3 0
1971 2 0 7 2 3 2
1972 1 0 2 1 0 1
1973 2 0 5 1 0 4
Totals 26 0 44 22 6 16
No Requests in 1960, 1962 and 1964
*Priorto 1969, refusals of requests were not recorded in Florida. See Advisory Opinions in Florida, supra note
3, at 332.
Summary No. 5: Maine
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I II III IV V VI
Year LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT
1961 4 1 5 1 0 1 9 2 11 5 0 5 2 0 2 00 0 2 0 2 02 2 0 00
1963 40 4 0 00 11 0 11 20 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 02 2 0 00
1965 2 0 2 0 00 12 0 12 00 0 8 0 8 000 3 0 3 1 0 1 0 00
1966 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 041 0 1 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 00 0 303
1967 8 0 8 10 1 26 0 26 1 0 1 16 0 16 000 40 4 5 0 S 000
1968 1 0 1 00 0 101000 00 0 0 00 00 0 1 0 1 000
1969 5 1 6 0 00 17 4 21 90 9 0 1 1 2 3 5 1 0 1 5 0 000
1970 2 1 3 0 0 0 6 1 7 20 2 0 00 1 0 1 0 11 20 2 1 0 1
1971 42 6 2 0 2 4 4 8 2 0 2 2 2 4 000 02 2 00 0 0 00
1973 4 1 5 00 0 25 3 28 20020 00 0 033 0 0 0 S 0 00
Totals 36 6 42 4 0 4 115 14 129 42 0 42 28 3 31 3 6 9 12 3 IS 19 4 23 4 0 4
No Requests in 1960, 1962, 1964 and 1972
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Summary No. 6: Massachusetts*
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I II III IV V VI
Year LG T L GT LG T L G T LG T LG T L G T L GT LG T
1960 2 0 2 o 0 0 21 0 21 3 0 3 00 0 30 3 90 9 60 6
1962 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 02 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 20 2 0 0 0
1963 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0
1964 5 1 6 0 00 8 1 9 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 3 0 3 3 0 3
1965 4 0 4 0 0 0 12 0 12 2 0 2 3 0 3 1 0 1 3 0 3 3 0 3
1966 1 0 1 000 8 0 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 30 3 40 4 0 00
1967 2 1 3 0 00 4 5 9 3 1 4 12 3 0 00 0 0 0 02 2
1968 4 1 5 0 0 0 10 1 11 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 6 0 1 1
1969 6 2 8 1 0 1 28 5 33 6 0 6 0 0 0 8 5 13 7 0 7 7 0 7
1970 7 0 7 1 0 1 17 0 17 9 0 9 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 7
1971 4 4 8 1 0 1 5 10 15 2 1 3 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 5 7
1972 2 2 4 0 0 0 4 2 6 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
1973 2 3 5 0 11 7 5 12 5 3 8 1 0 1 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 0 0
Totals 42 14 56 3 1 4 128 29 1.57 39 5 44 9 3 12 18 8 26 34 3 37 30 9 39
No Requests in 1961
*Requests by the Council not included; only three requests were made by the Council during the period
studied. Ma.54; Ma.21; Ma.1S.
Summary No. 7: New Hampshire
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I II I1 IV V VI
Year L G T LG T L G T L G T L G T L G T L G T LG T L G T
1960 0 1 1 0 00 0 2 2 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 00
1961 7 3 10 0 0 0 17 7 24 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 8 0 8 3 4 7 5 0 5
1962 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 1 00 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
1963 2 0 2 0 00 6 0 6 00 0 303 0 0 0 30 3 0 0 0 00 0
1965 4 2 6 0 0 0 13 8 21 1 0 1 2 0 2 1 0 1 6 0 6 1 8 9 2 0 2
1966 0 1 1 0 00 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
1967 3 2 5 0 0 0 16 9 25 10 3 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 5 5 5 1 6
1968 0 2 2 0 00 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1969 5 2 7 2 0 2 23 3 26 10 1 11 0 0 0 4 1 5 2 0 2 3 1 4 4 0 4
1970 1 3 4 0 0 0 1 7 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 0
1971 10 0 10 0 0 0 23 0 23 8 0 8 000 0 0 0 4 0 4 9 0 9 2 0 2
1972 3 1 4 0 0 0 10 2 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 0 7 2 0 2 1 0 1
1973 6 S 11 0 0 0 10 16 26 6 1 7 1 0 1 0 7 7 1 4 5 2 4 6 0 0 0
Totals 41 24 65 2 1 3 119 63 182 37 5 42 6 0 6 5 20 25 32 9 41 20 26 46 19 3 22
No Requests in 1964
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Summary No. 8: Rhode Island
Denials of Questions -Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I HI III IV V Vi
Year LGT L GT LGT LGT LGT LG T L G T L GT LG T
1960 1 3 4 000 1 7 8 0 00 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6 7 000
1961 0 4 4 00 0 0 7 7 0 00 0 2 2 0 00 0 3 3 0 2 2 000
1962 2 3 5 1 0 1 1 9 10 0 11 0 S 5 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 1
1963 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 000
1964 0 11 0 0 0 S 5 0 00 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 4 0 0 0 000
1965 5 2 7 30 3 3 6 9 000 0 0 0 000 0 6 6 3 0 3 000
1966 1 2 3 1 0 1 0 6 6 022 0 3 3 0 00 0 1 1 000 0 00
1969 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1970 2 1 3 20 2 0 1 1 000 0 0 0 000 0 1 1 0 0 0 000
1971 6 1 7 3 1 4 5 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 00 4 0 4 0 0 0 000
1972 0 2 2 00 0 0 4 4 000 0 0 0 000 0 2 2 0 2 2 000
1973 0 2 2 00 0 0 6 6 0 00 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 4 4 0 0 0 000
Totals 17 23 40 10 2 12 10 53 63 1 3 4 0 10 10 0 4 4 4 26 30 4 10 14 1 0 1
No Requests in 1967 and 1968
Summary 9: South Dakota
Denials of Questions Categories of Questions
Requests Requests Posed I II I1 IV V VI
Year LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT LGT
1962 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1963 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1966 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1967 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1968 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1969 1 0 2 0 0 0 2
1971 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1973 3 1 5 0 2 0 3
Totals 10 2 12 1 4 1 6
No Requests in 1960, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1970 and 1972
